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People have often noted that during the twentieth century
federal legislative, executive and judicial power have steadily
eroded state governmental power.' The growth of federal
power at the expense of state power has been caused by the
apparent inability of the states to resolve problems of national
scope. Many people believe that state governments cannot
meet the challenges of the business cycle, war, pollution, tech-
nology, crime and much else. In the face of these develop-
ments we might be tempted to dismiss our federalist order as
incompetent and outmoded. We might find ourselves thinking
that any legal system with two independent sources of political
power, state and federal, is inevitably afficted with problems of
coordination, inefficiency and conflict. Perhaps we should help
accelerate the disintegration of state power and look forward
to the day when the states exist in name only.
I shall argue that, despite the need for greater exercise of
federal power, we should continue to protect the rights of
states to choose their own destinies to the greatest possible ex-
tent, even at the cost of some loss in national efficiency. I shall
base the case for federalism upon two arguments, the first neg-
ative in form, the second affirmative. First, I shall argue that
federalism is a necessary, or at least useful, means of avoiding
certain political evils. Second, I shall argue that federalism is a
necessary, or at least useful, means of promoting certain posi-
tive political goods.
TELEOLOGICAL ARGUMENTS TO JUSTIFY FEDERALISM
Both of the justifications I shall offer share a structural char-
acteristic; they are both teleological arguments. A teleological
argument is one in which a course of action, M, is recom-
mended on the basis of M's being a necessary, or at least use-
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ful, means of accomplishing some desirable objective.2 The
schematic form of such arguments is:
1) 0 is a desirable objective.
2) M is a necessary, or at least useful, means of accomplish-
ing 0.
3) Hence, M ought to be done.
People who intelligently offer teleological arguments do not
claim that theirarguments are deductively valid.3 That is, they
do not claim that in every possible world in which the premises
hold, the conclusions of their arguments also hold. An exam-
ple may clarify this 1oint. Consider the argument:
1) Reducing the risk of heart attack is a desirable objective.
2) Getting regular exercise is a necessary, or at least useful,
means of reducing the risk of heart attack.
3) Hence, getting regular exercise ought to be done.
Situations may exist in which the premises are true but the
conclusion false. For example, I might have a substantial risk
of heart attack, and it may be true that getting regular exercise
would be a useful way for me to reduce that risk. But there
might be other factors making it either impossible, or at least
undesirable, for me to get regular exercise. Perhaps I have just
broken my legs and arms in a car accident. Or perhaps my
heart condition is so bad that any exercise at all would proba-
bly kill me. Thus, the argument is obviously not deductively
valid.
Hence, it is logically inappropriate to ask of any particular
teleological argument whether it is valid or invalid. When we
purport to argue deductively, our arguments are either valid or
invalid; there is no third alternative. But when we argue
nondeductively, the question of the strength of our arguments
is not an all-or-nothing affair. Nondeductive arguments must
be evaluated in terms of degrees of strength. Some are
stronger than others, but, unlike deductively valid arguments,
none guarantee an absolutely certain connection between
premises and conclusions.
2. On teleological reasoning, see THE Summa Theologica OF SAINT THOMAS AQUI-
NAS, Vol. I, 609-15 (Great Books of the Western World, Vol. 19 (1952)) (rev. by D.
Sullivan). See also M.J. ADLER, THE TIME OF OUR LIVES 159-61 (1970).
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EVALUATING A TELEOLOGICAL ARGUMENT
If we cannot reasonably evaluate teleological arguments in
terms of the standards for deductive validity, (e.g., the stan-
dards of propositional logic, first-order quantification theory,
modal logic or set theory), then how should we evaluate them?
There are at least three ways of evaluating a teleological
argument.
First, we can evaluate the claim that the objective, 0, is de-
sirable. We can do this in at least two ways. We can try to
determine whether 0 is really desirable at all. And, conceding
for the sake of discussion that 0 is desirable, we can ask
whether M is as desirable as the proponent of the argument
supposes.
Second, we can evaluate the premise that the recommended
course of action, M, is a necessary, or at least useful, means of
accomplishing 0. Even though 0 may be as desirable as the
proponent claims, his argument is only as strong as the credi-
bility of his claim that M is a necessary or useful means of ac-
complishing 0.
Third, we can ask whether the proposition that M ought to
be done really follows (in some nondeductive sense, of course)
from the premises. We could ask at least three questions in
this regard. First, we can inquire whether there are more effi-
cient means of accomplishing 0. Second, we can ask whether
the resources which will be required for M could be better
used for accomplishing some objective which is more desirable
than 0. And third, we can try to determine whether, even
though the resources needed for M may have no more press-
ing uses, accomplishing 0 would conflict with the attainment
of even more important objectives.
The class of teleological arguments is a subclass of the class
of practical arguments.4 A practical argument is an argument
whose conclusion takes the form of an assertion that some act,
A, either ought to be done, may be done without blame, or
should not be done at all. We use practical arguments to guide
our choices. In making choices we necessarily choose between
alternatives, and some alternatives are better than others. We
4. For a discussion of practical reasoning, see ARISTOTLE, Nicomachean Ethics, bk.
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use practical arguments .because we want to make good
choices.
When we make political arguments we necessarily use practi-
cal arguments. For, in making political choices we must
choose between competing objectives and between alternative
ways of pursuing objectives.
THE NEGATIVE JUSTIFICATION FOR FEDERALISM
The negative justification for federalism can be expressed in
the following way:
1) The objective of reducing the risk of arbitrary and mor-
ally unjustifiable political coercion is desirable.
2) Maintaining a federalist legal system is a necessary, or at
least useful, means of reducing the risk of arbitrary and
morally unjustifiable political coercion.
3) Hence, a federalist legal system ought to be maintained.
What about the first premise? One question we naturally ask
is whether there is a serious risk of arbitrary and morally unjus-
tifiable political coercion at all. Perhaps we do not have to
worry about reducing the risk of tyrannical political coercion
because there is no real possibility of its occurring. But evi-
dence from at least four sources provides strong support for
the premise. History reveals a dreary succession of acts of
political coercion, imprisonment, torture and murder. What
legal order has ever been free for very long from acts of polit-
ical terror? And evidence from psychology, observation of
others around us, and ordinary introspection should surely
convince us that there is a deeply embedded tendency in the
human heart to tyrannically coerce others. We might argue
among ourselves as to the cause of this basic tendency, but the
fact of the tendency seems undeniable.
We might ask a second question about the first premise. As-
suming that there is a substantial risk of arbitrary and morally
unjustifiable political coercion, is that risk an undesirable one?
Perhaps we should strive to bring about situations of political
terror. Perhaps a condition of political terror would constitute
the very fulfillment and meaning of human existence. Con-
vinced readers of such works as Mein Kampf 5 might well think
so. This question can be resolved only by appealing to the nat-
5. A. HITLER, MEIN KAMPF (1925).
[Vol. 16
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ural law criterion of observation of others and oneself. Have
we ever observed a person exercising morally unjustifiable co-
ercion who seemed to be deeply fulfilled and integrated? On
the contrary, isn't it obvious that such persons seem spiritually
fragmented? And what about the facts of introspection? Isn't
it clear that in our blackest moments of hatred and rage we
suffer the most deeply, and come the closest to despair and
disintegration?
We might ask a third question about the first premise. As-
suming that arbitrary and unjustifiable political coercion is un-
desirable, is it seriously undesirable? Are there other political
risks about which we should be more concerned? But it seems
that unjustifiable political coercion frustrates all possibilities
for political good. What sustained and coherent political good
can be achieved without freedom from political terror? Such
freedom is a necessary condition for promoting the common
good of all.
The first premise obviously rests upon a certain theory of
human nature, viz., the theory that there is an ineradicable
fault in the human spirit which renders unattainable a perfect
political order of cooperation and mutual love and regard.
There is a natural link between a commitment to federalism,
on the one hand, and the view that we have strong tendencies
to oppress others and to pursue, at others' expense, our own
narrow concerns. Federalism is not necessarily linked to the
theory of total human depravity, but it does seem to require
the theory of partial depravity. Those who find the theory of
partial human depravity doubtful will probably have difficulty
accepting federalist legal systems. On the other hand, those
who (like myself) find the theory of partial depravity almost
self-evidently true, will find federalist patterns perfectly appro-
priate and even necessary. 6
What about the second premise? Should we believe that
maintaining a federalist legal system is a necessary, or at least
useful, means of reducing the risk of arbitrary and morally un-
justifiable political coercion? One reason people believe in a
federalist system is because they think that fragmenting polit-
ical power is a useful means of inhibiting the inevitable ten-
6. For an illuminating discussion of the relationship between political theories
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dency of persons and groups to politically intimidate and
coerce others. There is a direct relationship between the ex-
tent to which political power and structures are unified and op-
portunities for abusing political power. And there is an inverse
relationship between the degree to which political power is
fragmented and the chances for abuse of power. The greater
the degree of political fragmentation, the more difficult it is to
build the coalitions necessary for political oppression.7
Suppose that we are reasonably convinced that the premises
are true. Should we conclude that we ought to maintain a fed-
eralist legal system? That is, does the conclusion follow from
the premises?
In this regard, we might ask whether the objective of reduc-
ing the risk of political oppression might not be more effi-
ciently served by some political method other than federalism.
It does seem that the objective could be promoted in other
ways. For example, a unitary political system with a separation
of powers principle would promote the objective. This is the
kind of political order we would have in the United States if
our federal government with its three branches was the only
source of political power. But although this alternative would
promote the end of reducing the risk of political oppression, it
would not promote it more efficiently than the federalist pat-
tern does. The primary advantage of a federalist system is that
it fragments political power into geographical units, making
unified political oppression more difficult than it would other-
wise be. A "horizontal" separation of powers within the fed-
eral government is a very good thing. But it cannot
accomplish what a "vertical" fragmentation between national
and local power can.
Second, we might ask whether the resources required for
maintaining a federalist system might be better spent in pro-
moting some more desirable end. But what more desirable
end is there than that of reducing the risk of political oppres-
sion? Political liberty is a necessary condition for attaining any
positive political goods; without political liberty we can achieve
nothing else of positive political value. Thus, there are no
more desirable objectives.
7. Avoiding political oppression by fragmenting political power is the essence
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Third, does maintaining a federalist system conflict with any
more important ends? One might think, for example, that our
federalist legal order makes the resolution of national
problems such as pollution, unemployment, the business cycle
and crime more difficult than it would otherwise be. And it
does seem that a unified legal order could more easily resolve
such concerns. There is an inevitable inefficiency and lack of
coordination in a system in which smaller geographical units
have separate legislative, executive and judicial powers.
But it seems to me that, while proponents of federalism
should concede this efficiency point, they are nevertheless jus-
tified in adhering to federalism because the probable loss in
governmental efficiency is more than offset by the gain in re-
ducing the risk of political oppression. Again, without political
liberty all other political good is unattainable. Hence, it is jus-
tifiable to sacrifice some measure of those other goods in order
to achieve the more fundamental good of political liberty.
THE AFFIRMATIVE CASE FOR FEDERALISM
I shall state the affirmative case for federalism as follows:
1) Maintaining a legal order in which there exist the condi-
tions for the greatest possible common realization of the
essential human powers and capacities is desirable.
2) Maintaining a federalist legal order is a necessary, or at
least useful, means of maintaining a legal order in which
there exists the greatest possible common realization of
the essential human powers and capacities.
3) Hence, a federalist legal order ought to be maintained.
The first premise is supported by the natural law conception
of the proper role of government.8 The government has not
only an obligation to promote the negative human good of its
citizens by maintaining conditions for protecting persons from
oppression by government and by other citizens, but also an
obligation to promote the positive human good of its citizens.
Government can promote the positive human good of its citi-
zens by establishing the conditions for that which the natural
law tradition calls "the common good." The common good is
that situation in which each member of the society has the
8. For a discussion of the natural law conception of the role of government, see
Y. SIMON, A GENERAL THEORY OF AuTHORrrY 23-79 (1962);J. MARITAIN, THE PERSON
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greatest possible opportunity for the free development of her
or his essential human capacities and powers. The natural law
tradition asserts that humans share a common essence of basic
capacities and powers, and that happiness or fulfillment can be
achieved only through the freely chosen self-realization of
those capacities and powers.
This theory of government's proper role contrasts sharply
with the nineteenth century liberal vision in which govern-
ment's only appropriate role is the negative one of keeping all
of us away from each other's throats. The natural law propo-
nent agrees that keeping us from killing and oppressing each
other is an obligatory task for government. But she or he goes
beyond affirming that obligation and asserts that government
is also morally obligated to affirmatively promote the free self-
realization of its citizens. For example, a natural law propo-
nent typically believes that providing public education is an af-
firmative obligation of government. It is difficult to see how
the nineteenth century liberal conception could be used to jus-
tify such a public obligation.
Why should we believe that goyernment has such an affirma-
tive moral obligation? The natural law tradition answers that
we should believe it because we find within ourselves a funda-
mental desire to promote the conditions of others' well-being,
and we therefore naturally want to use the power of govern-
ment to carry out this purpose. That is to say, we discover that
an integral part of pursuing our own self-realization is promot-
ing the freely chosen self-realization of others as well. Clearly,
the natural law tradition affirms that the human heart is not
totally depraved and that at least part of the self seeks unity
and cooperation with others for its own sake. This affirmation
is not incompatible with the affirmation (which the natural law
tradition also makes) that another part of the human heart car-
ries the seeds of evil and destruction. There is a conflict within
the human essence. The interesting question is not whether
the self is divided against itself, but rather whether one part is
more deeply embedded than the other.
Note that it is not only the affirmative case for federalism
which presupposes that on some level human beings have a
desire for the freely chosen self-realization of others. The neg-
ative case presupposes the same thing. Why should we even
be concerned about maintaining governmental structures in
which the risk of political oppression and coercion is reduced
[Vol. 16
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unless we are concerned, on some level, about the well-being
of others? A purely self-centered concern about one's own
safety does not seem sufficient to explain the pursuit of the
objective. For, surely many of us could promote our own nar-
row concerns as well if we were ourselves part of a ruling class
which oppressed others. The fact that we intuitively recognize
the moral unworthiness of pursuing such an objective is evi-
dence of our mutual concern for each other.
Additional evidence of the reliance of the negative case upon
the view that human nature is not completely depraved arises
from the fact that the negative case presupposes a willingness
on the part of each of us to "tie our own hands." That is, de-
spite the fact that some of us might feel that we, unlike others,
would never try to unfairly oppress others, we nevertheless
agree to a mutual tying of hands. And we agree to this mutual
self-restraint because each of us understands, on some level of
awareness, that given appropriate circumstances and strong
enough temptations, any of us might succumb to the passion
for oppression.
What about the second premise of the affirmative case? Are
there good reasons for believing that maintaining a federalist
system is a necessary, or at least useful, means of maintaining a
legal order in which there exist the conditions for the greatest
possible common realization of the essential human powers
and capacities?
We can begin to grasp the argument for this premise by
thinking about the relationship between a child and her par-
ents in a loving family situation. Although the parents, of
course, do many things for the child, especially when she is
very young, they know she must do some things for herself,
and that the older she gets, the more she should make her own
choices. The reason is that the good of realizing the essential
human powers is achievable only through freely chosen acts.
No one can achieve my intrinsic good for me. I must pursue it
myself through my own freely chosen projects.
This insight into the nature of the family association and the
relationship in that association between the family unit as a
whole and the individual members of that unit leads to a gen-
eralization which the natural law tradition calls the "principle
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[T]he principle is one of justice. It affirms that the proper
function of association is to help the participants in the as-
sociation to help themselves or, more precisely, to consti-
tute themselves through the individual initiatives of
choosing commitments (including commitments to friend-
ship and other forms of association) and of realizing these
commitments through personal inventiveness and effort in
projects (many of which will, of course, be co-operative in
execution and even communal in purpose). And since in
large organizations the process of decision-making is more
remote from the initiative of most of those many members
who will carry out the decision, the same principle requires
that larger associations should not assume functions which
can be performed efficiently by smaller associations. 9
Thus, the principle of subsidiarity is based upon the belief
that taking away from larger associations functions which can
be feasibly performed by smaller associations necessarily
causes a greater number of persons to freely pursue their own
projects and thereby realize their own powers. As Finnis says,
"No one can spend all his time, in all his associations, leading
and taking initiatives; but one who is never more than a cog in
big wheels turned by others is denied participation in one im-
portant aspect of human well-being. '"iO
So, states should be given powers independent of the federal
government because in that way smaller associations will be
forced to perform functions that would otherwise be per-
formed by the larger association. And this is desirable because
in that way a greater number of persons will be encouraged to
make choices concerning the conditions of their own lives,
thereby freely realizing their own humanity to a greater extent.
A side benefit of allocating independent political power to
states is that each state can learn from the results of other
states' choices. Each state is a forum for legal and social exper-
imentation. I The results of these experiments, whether good
9. J. FINNIs, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 146-47 (1980). For a good
discussion of the principle of subsidiarity, see R. NISBET, THE SOCIAL PHILOSOPHERS
149-206 (concise ed. 1982).
10. J. FINNIS, supra note 9, at 147.
11. In New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932), the majority
overruled an Oklahoma statute which according to the Court imposed unreasonable
restrictions on private business. Justice Brandeis, in his dissent, observed that the
majority did not allow Oklahoma to function as a forum for social experimentation.
He stated that "one of the happy incidents of the federal system [is] that a single
[Vol. 16
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or bad, can be used by other states for their own guidance.
They can avoid experiments which result in evils, and pursue,
if they wish, those which promote the common good.
A second side benefit is the increased opportunity for wit-
nessing the presence of diversity. An important part of human
integration is understanding that the good is realizable in dif-
ferent ways. Parochially believing that persons who live differ-
ently than I do are necessarily humanly defective is ultimately
destructive both to me and to those whose lives I affect. Being
confronted with the fact that people in states other than mine
do things differently from the way in which they are done in my
state is generally good. The experience of diversity helps shat-
ter our narrow visions of human excellence. It is good to re-
mind ourselves from time to time that we are only finite
creatures, and pretty poor versions of finitude at that.
What about the conclusion of the affirmative case for feder-
alism? Is it supported by the premises? Should federalism be
maintained?
Can the objective of establishing and maintaining a legal or-
der in which there exist the conditions for the greatest possible
common realization of the essential human powers and capaci-
ties be more efficiently pursued through some means other
than a federalist legal system? It seems unlikely. The principle
of subsidiarity requires that smaller, rather than larger, as-
sociations perform functions whenever possible. Surely, a
good way of accomplishing this is breaking down larger as-
sociations into smaller ones on the basis of geographical parti-
tion. One could try to satisfy the principle of subsidiarity in
other ways. For example, one could form smaller associations
from people chosen at random, without regard to their geo-
graphical locations. But such a method would obviously be in-
ferior to the method of tying the identity of the smaller
associations to geographical units.
Does maintaining a federalist system conflict with the accom-
plishment of any goal which is considered more important
than the goal of promoting the common good? Again, it
seems unlikely. What more important goal is there than pro-
moting the common good? And, if the principle of subsidiarity
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is true, how can the common good be pursued as well in any
other way?
Perhaps the resources required for maintaining a federalist
system should be committed to some more important objec-
tive? But, as I have just argued, there are no more important
objectives. And the resources required for maintaining feder-
alism are the resources of self-determination. They are, there-
fore, not suited for any task except that of self-determination.
Let them be used for the task for which they are ideally
equipped.
BALANCE STATE AND FEDERAL POWER TO SAFEGUARD
HUMAN RIGHTS
There is, of course, a concern I have not yet addressed.
What about the possibility that basic human rights will be
violated by state governments? Doesn't making state govern-
ments independent sources of political power increase the
chances of human rights being oppressed by those
governments?
One must concede that there is such a risk, and that there
are many examples in our nation's history of basic human
rights being oppressed by state governmental power.' 2 But
one must remember that basic human rights are at risk with
respect to federal power as well, and perhaps even more so in
light of the greater resources of the federal government.' 3
The solution to the risk of state abuse of human rights is the
careful use of federal power to override state power when the
latter threatens such rights. Such federal power can be exer-
cised through executive, legislative and judicial agencies. But
what about limiting the overriding federal power? The best
solution is placing in the hands of federal judges the crucially
important task of overseeing the exercise of federal executive
and legislative power. By virtue of their training and role, fed-
eral judges are more likely than members of Congress or the
President to remember that coercive political power will inevi-
12. See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (Supreme Court upheld a
Louisiana law requiring separate, but equal, seating accommodations for black and
white train passengers).
13. During World War II the federal government required American citizens of
Japanese ancestry to move from their homes near West Coast military installations to
inland detention centers. See, e.g., Exparte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944); Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
[Vol. 16
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tably be abused by both federal and state power, and that the
primary purpose of constitutional adjudication is maintaining a




I conclude that a federalist legal order is desirable and ought
to be maintained. Federalism promotes both greater freedom
from the risk of political oppression and terror, and increased
opportunity for freely chosen self-realization of the essential
human powers. Federalism would be worth maintaining even
if it could only partially achieve these values.
14. For the essentials, see Hamilton's argument in the Federalist papers discuss-
ing the role of federal judges. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (A. Hamilton).
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